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There is no more important issue in the economics of the family than the impact of parents
on the behavior of their children. By providing rewards and imposing constraints, parents
seek to affect their childrenÕs behavior. The explanation of these actions is that the childÕs
conduct directly enters into the parentÕs utility function. In this paper, we use that framework
to explore the role of parental control over his or her childÕs delinquent behavior. Using
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we estimate the impact of family
income and various dimensions of family structure on a youthÕs contact with the criminal
justice system between the ages of 14 and 22. From this analysis, we conclude that the
single most important factor affecting these measures of delinquency is the presence of his
father in the home. All other factors, including family income, are much less important.
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I. Introduction
There is no more important issue in the economics of the family than the
impact of parents on the behavior of their children. By providing rewards and
imposing constraints, parents seek to affect their childrenÕs behavior. The
explanation of these actions is that the childÕs conduct directly enters into the
parentÕs utility function. There is considerable evidence from evolutionary
biology that altruistic behavior towards oneÕs offspring is our common heritage
* We thank Ted Bergstrom, George Borjas, Jeff Grogger, Tom Rice, John Lott, Ron Andersen,
John Donahue, Karen Needles and James Q. Wilson for helpful comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts of this paper.210 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
(Trivers, 1985; and Clutton-Brock, 1991), which creates this type of utility
function. In this paper, we use this framework to explore the role of parental
control over his or her childÕs delinquent behavior.1
The most important feature of parental conduct is the mere fact of being
there, of remaining in the home with the child. This factor has become
increasingly relevant over the past three decades as higher rates of divorce
and illegitimacy have led increasing numbers of children to live in households
where a parent, typically the father, is absent. In 1960, 87.7 percent of U.S.
children lived with both parents, but this proportion fell to 68.1 percent by
1998. Of those children remaining, 73.1 percent lived with their mother but
not with their father, 13.8 percent lived with their father but not with their
mother, while the remaining 13.0 percent lived with others who were not
their parents (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1998). We focus here on the role
played by parental absence on the childÕs subsequent conduct.
Reviewing the evidence on such matters, J.Q. Wilson (1993) writes:
Compared to children who are raised by their biological father and
mother, those raised by mothers, black or white, who have never married
are more likely to be poor, to acquire less schooling, to be expelled or
suspended from school, to experience emotional or behavioral
problems, to display antisocial behavior, to have trouble getting along
with their peers, and to start their own single-parent families. These
unhappy outcomes afflict both girls and boys, but they have a more
adverse effect on boys.2
This statement suggests various hypotheses, which are the subject of this
paper.
1 A similar framework is employed in Case et al. (1999), which is applied instead to food
consumption within the family.
2 Wilson (1993, p. 176). See also Antecol, et al. (2001).
3 See the following statement from a recent discussion of teenage violence (Hechinger,211 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY
In addition to family structure, poverty is also considered by many as a
major explanation for delinquent behavior.3 To these observers, income is the
critical factor and antisocial conduct would decline if family income were
increased. Because there are two rival themes that are used to explain
delinquency, we explore the joint impact of income and family structure.
To be sure, there are other potential explanations for delinquent behavior.
These include the influence of peers as expressed through neighborhood
effects; prospects for legal employment; and law enforcement efforts that
increase probabilities of apprehension and conviction. These are relevant
factors, and indeed one of us has explored such matters in earlier research
(Phillips, Votey and Maxwell, 1972; Phillips and Votey, 1987). However,
sufficient information to measure these considerations is not available in our
data set, and also their exclusion is unlikely to upset our primary findings on
the influence of family structure. Neighborhood considerations are highly
correlated with family incomes, so those influences are largely incorporated
in that variable. In contrast, prospects for legal employment tend to be highly
correlated with cognitive skills,4 which are measured here by scores on the
Armed Forces Qualifications Test. And also there is little reason to believe
that deterrence is associated with family structure. We argue below that our
findings are not unduly influenced by these omitted variables.
To an extent, however, the role of peers is separate from neighborhood
effects, and also a relevant factor for determining child behavior. Indeed, this
factor may become all the more important as a childÕs family disintegrates,
and his or her supervision at home declines. For this reason, peer effects
represent, at least partially, the mirror image of family effects, and are thereby
embodied in the variable itself. This consideration influences our interpretation
of the empirical findings offered below.
1994, p. 4): ÒGrowing up in an environment of harsh poverty with a feeling that opportunities
for success are closed because of discrimination can lead to helplessness and rage that find
expression in violence.Ó
4 Card (1985).  Of course, greater ability may be correlated as well with higher levels of
education, making it difficult to separate completely the influence of ability on earnings.212 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
II. Alternate Hypotheses on Parental Behavior
Although economic agents are typically presumed to consider only their
own utility, that presumption has never applied to the interactions of parents
and children.5 For example, Becker (1981, p. 114), suggests a pattern of
asymmetric concerns in which the parentÕs utility function includes the
childrenÕs consumption as well as his or her own, while the childrenÕs utility
function depends only on their own consumption. This approach has led to
Òthe rotten-kid theorem,Ó an implication of which is that both parent and
child are better off when the parent is highly altruistic towards the child, but
both parties are worse off when altruism is lower or absent.6
While this analysis is framed in terms of consumption levels and monetary
transfers, it has broader implications than that. When a child agrees to sacrifice
his private goals for those of his family, he does so with the understanding
that ultimately he is better off.  And parents are willing to make the required
effort because they too are better off.
This analysis is equally cogent when families disintegrate. Becker (1977,
p.Ê507), writes that Òaltruism can benefit altruists only when there is substantial
interaction between them and the beneficiariesÓ (see also Becker, Landes and
Michael, 1972, pp. 1152-3). When interactions between parent and child
diminish, as a result of divorce and the fatherÕs absence from the home, an
expected result is that the parentÕs benevolence for the child declines. If the
decline is sufficient, the child will accept its implications and move to a more
selfish outcome; and both parent and child are worse off. A direct implication
of the rotten-kid theorem is that the childÕs conduct turns on the expected
benevolence of the parent.
When a family dissolves, an immediate effect is lost proximity between
the non-custodial parent and the child. As a result, the time and monetary
5 See BergstromÕs (1996) discussion of Adam SmithÕs views on these issues, pp. 1904-5.
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costs to both parties of maintaining close contact are substantially increased
(Weiss and Willis, 1985), and there is generally reduced concern by the absent
parent for the child.7
In the empirical analysis below, we investigate the impact of family
structure on childrenÕs delinquent behavior. Where both parents are present
in the home, we assume there is sufficient benevolence so that their children
follow family norms and do not respond to the temptations of lawlessness.
On the other hand, where parents are absent, we hypothesize there is not
sufficient altruism so that children more frequently seek their own pleasures
without regard to family strictures; and as a result, more frequently come into
contact with law enforcement officials. Following BeckerÕs (1977) suggestion
that altruism declines with lost proximity between altruist and beneficiary,
we let family structure serve as a proxy for a parentÕs altruistic conduct toward
his or her child.8
To be sure, other factors may be important as well. In particular, if family
incomes are higher, children may see less need for criminal activity to achieve
their goals, so that higher family incomes may be associated with less criminal
activity. In the analysis below, we examine both propositions for young men
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two.
7 A fatherÕs absence from the home typically leads him to have little contact with his child.
Fully 58 percent of absent fathers saw their child fewer than several times a year, while
only about one-quarter had contact more than once a week. Furthermore, parent-child
contact diminished over time. While 28 percent of absent fathers, separated for two years
or less, saw their child fewer than several times a year, that percentage increased to 42
percent between three and five years post-separation, to 62 percent for six to ten years
following the fatherÕs separation, and to fully 72 percent at eleven years or more (Seltzer,
1991, TablesÊ1 and 4, pp.Ê86, 91).
8 An alternate argument is that the critical factor for a boy is his opportunity to copy or
imitate his father; and that this is lost when the father is absent. This hypothesis suggests
that a substitute father would do nearly as well in limiting delinquent behavior, which is
tested in the empirical analysis below.214 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
III. Data
The data used in this study are the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), a frequently used data set collected annually at Ohio State University.9
In 1979, 12,686 young people, divided nearly equally between the genders,
were surveyed on a wide range of topics that included family structure. These
same respondents were asked in 1980 about their involvement with the criminal
justice system for the period ending in 1979.
In this study, delinquency is measured by whether a youth has ever been
charged with a crime between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two. From this
data set, 17.2 percent of young men had been charged but only 4.4 percent of
young women. Because there are such smaller numbers of criminal
involvement for young women, we cannot carry out the same econometric
analysis for both genders.
The youths were also asked with whom they lived at age fourteen. Their
responses were quite similar as between young men and women. Overall,
67.9 percent lived with both father and mother. The second most frequent
response was mother and no other man present, at 16.6 percent. The third
largest category was mother and stepfather, at 6.6 percent. For this
classification, however, there was a slight difference between young men and
women: 6.9 percent of the latter lived with their mother and stepfather but
only 6.4 percent of former. Finally, only 1.8 percent of the young men and 1.2
percent of the young women in the sample lived with their father and
stepmother, and only 1.3 percent of males and 1.0 percent of females lived
with their father and no woman present.
In terms of ethnicity, the sample is composed of 15.6 percent Hispanic,
25.2 percent Black, and 59.2 percent non-Hispanic, non-Black youths. Average
family income is $16,939, and varies between nothing and $75,001. The
logarithm of family income is approximately normally distributed in the range
of two standard deviations around the mean; however there is more weight in
the tails, especially for very low incomes.
9 See, for example, two recent papers which employ these data: Oettinger (1999) and Blau
(1999).215 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY
Data are also available for scores on the Armed Forces Qualifications
Test (A.F.Q. Test). During 1980, a battery of aptitude tests were given to
nearly all of the sample respondents. The areas covered included general
knowledge, arithmetic reasoning and paragraph comprehension, as well as
numerical operations. Raw scores are then converted into national percentiles,
which is the variable included in the empirical analysis.10
As reported in Table 1, Black youths come from families with average
incomes of approximately two-thirds of that for families of majority youths.
The percentage of families with a father present when the boy was fourteen is
79.7 percent for non-Hispanic, non-Blacks; 72.0 percent for Hispanics; and
54.8 percent for Blacks. The corresponding figures for mother present are
93.5 percent for non-Hispanic, non-Blacks; 93.7 percent for Hispanics; and
90.5 percent for Blacks. There is thus greater variability among ethnic groups
for the presence of fathers than for mothers.
10 These scores are highly correlated with IQ values, that are widely considered to measure
general intelligence (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994, p. 584). However, Blau suggests that
there is doubt as to whether the AFQT measures achievement or ability (Blau, 1999, p.Ê265).
Table 1. Sample Characteristics for Three Ethnic Groups
Hispanic Black Non-Hispanic,
Non-Black
Ever charged (%) 18.2 14.3 18.1
Average age (years) 17.7 17.7 18.0
A.F.Q. Test (%)* 32.1 23.0 52.6
Average family income ($) 15,524 13,426 19,442
Father present (%) 71.9 54.8 79.7
Mother present (%) 93.7 90.5 93.5
No. of observations 728 1,200 3,009
Note: * This variable is not available for all observations.216 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Note also that the fractions of male youths reporting being charged with a
crime are comparable for two of the three ethnic groups, but Black youths
report lower levels. This finding raises concern about the NLSY sample of
minority youth since other data report that Black youths have a higher chance
of being in prison by age 25. According to more recent Department of Justice
figures, the probability of incarceration for a Black male is 15.9 percent, for
an Hispanic male is 6.3 percent, and for a White male is 1.7 percent (Bonczar
and Beck, 1997, Table 3, p. 2). Because Black youths in jail or otherwise
involved with the criminal justice system may be under-represented in this
sample, we analyze delinquency separately for the three ethnic groups, and
find below that our results do not depend on ethnicity.11
IV. A Preliminary Look at Family Structure
While the econometric analysis below explores the influence separately
of a fatherÕs or motherÕs presence, we first consider these factors together.
Although this approach suffers from the small number of observations
available for some categories, it does suggest some hypotheses. There are
thirty categories of family structure reported in the NLSY.  The five largest
were selected, which together account for nearly 95 percent of the observations.
The rest were aggregated as ÒotherÓ family structures. The results are reported
in Table 2.
The most interesting comparisons in Table 2 are those for family structures
in which one parent is absent from the home and a step-parent is or is not
present. Note the striking differences between the ÒMother-stepfatherÓ and
ÒFather-stepmotherÓ categories: the reported probabilities of delinquency are
twice as high in the ÒMother-stepfatherÓ case as in the ÒFather-stepmotherÓ
case. This observation suggests the importance of fatherÕs presence at home
11 Note, however, that another study of juvenile crime reports that Òan increased fraction of
the population that is black is associated with lower juvenile crime ratesÓ (Levitt, 1998, p.
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12 Although our hypotheses rest on differences in altruistic behavior between parents and
step-parents, there are also differences in abusive behavior which could account for our
Table 2. Delinquency by Family Structure: Young Men
Family structure at No. of Percentage Average family
age fourteen cases  ever charged  income
Father-mother 3,405 15.0 19,511
Mother-no man 789 19.6 11,550
Mother-stepfather 315 28.9 14,995
Father-stepmother 89 12.4 17,567
Father-no woman 62 22.6 14,784
Other structures 267 24.7 11,492
Chi-Square coef. N/A 58.69* N/A
Total number of cases 4,927 4,927 4,922a
Notes: a Data on income for five cases are not available. *Statistically significant at the 1%
level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. N/A not applicable.
for his sonÕs conduct. In addition, however, the former category has a lower
average family income than the latter, which could also account for differences
in the proportion of youths charged with a crime.
Just as interesting is the comparison with the mother present, between
cases where there is no other man present and where there is a stepfather.
Again, having a stepfather present appears to increase the prospects for
delinquency, despite higher average incomes. On the other hand, looking at
the corresponding comparison with the father present, a stepmother seems to
play a salutary role. These results suggest that a step-parentÕs gender may be
critically important. For boys, a stepmotherÕs presence may reduce the
prospects of delinquency, although the presence of a stepfather may have the
opposite effect.12218 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
We also carried out a contingency table analysis for this measure of
delinquency. As indicated by the chi-square value, there is a statistically
significant effect overall of family structure. Furthermore, since the sum of
squares of these residuals is the chi-square statistic, we can determine which
cells contributed most to this significant association. Critically, the Mother-
stepfather category represented significantly more involvement with the
criminal justice system than predicted under the assumption of independence.
In contrast, the Father-mother category had significantly less involvement
than projected. These two structures together accounted for a major share of
the significant chi-square value.
The data provided in Table 2 are difficult to interpret because the
delinquency and income variables include youths who have remained with
one or both parents as well as those who live separately. If he lives with at
least one parent, daily supervision and guidance are possible. In contrast, if a
youth lives separately, he could be in the armed services, away at school, or
on his own. This factor may have an important impact on delinquency because
freedom from parental control may lead him to experiment with risky behavior.
Income levels are also impacted by living arrangements. Average family
income for young men living in a parental household was $17,644 in 1979 as
contrasted with $12,126 for those who did not. Income levels are thereby 31
percent lower for youths who no longer live with their parents. The relationship
between income and delinquency is thus confounded by this selection decision.
V. An Empirical Framework
Self-selection is central to the decision of a young man to live with his
parents. Accordingly, we employ a mover-stayer model, and estimate a self-
findings. After reviewing the evidence on this issue, Daly and Wilson (1989), pp. 87-88,
find that ÒStepparenthood per se remains the single most powerful risk factor for child
abuse that has yet been identifiedÓ. Unfortunately these writers do not distinguish between
stepmothers and stepfathers.  [We thank Ted Bergstrom for this reference.]219 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY
selection equation for the decision to remain within the parental household.
From that equation, we derive a self-selection correction, which is then
included in separate equations for ÒstayersÓ and ÒmoversÓ that relate to whether
a youth has been charged with a crime.
The self-selection equation is estimated using exogenous demographic
and regional variables, the most important of which is the youthÕs age. While
only 4 percent of young men in the NLSY sample lived separately from their
parents at age fourteen, fully 76 percent did so by age twenty-two; and there
is a direct progression with age. Additional variables include indicators of
race, ethnicity, geographic region, and also the labor market unemployment
rate, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether or not he lived in a
SMSA. We also include the educational backgrounds of both mother and
father as measured by the number of school-years completed.
The dependent variable in this equation is dichotomous: it is coded one if
he lives separately from both parents, if both parents are deceased, or if one
parent is deceased and he lives separately from the other. It is coded zero if
the youth lives with either or both parents.
If there are unobserved variables affecting both the decision of a young
man to live separately and his prospective delinquency, then the error terms
of the two equations, one explaining the mover-stayer decision and the other
explaining delinquency will be correlated. Because of the incidental truncation
arising from estimating delinquency separately for ÒstayersÓ and ÒmoversÓ,
the expectation of the error term in these equations are not zero. For example,
if the error term in the self-selection equation and the error term in the
delinquency equation are distributed bivariately normal, then for ÒstayersÓ
E(eS ) = r seS + Inverse MillÕs Ratio                                                            (1)
where eS is the error term for the delinquency equation for ÒstayersÓ, r is the
correlation between eS and the error term from the mover-stayer equation,
and seS is the standard deviation of eS. This expression applies as well to
ÒmoversÓ, but of course the definition of the Inverse MillÕs ratio differs between220 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
the two groups.13 This self-selection correction is used, and a coefficient for
this ratio estimated in each delinquency equation.
A probit form is used to estimate the self-selection equation from which
the appropriate corrections are derived. The Inverse Mills ratio calculated
from the self-selection equation is highly correlated with the youthÕs age. The
correlation coefficients are -0.90 for ÒstayersÓ and -0.89 for ÒmoversÓ. For
this reason, we do not include age as a separate explanatory variable in some
of the delinquency equations.
A second empirical issue is whether family structure can be treated as
exogenous.  Fathers are present or absent for a reason, which could be related
to his childÕs delinquent behavior. For example, jailed fathers are absent, but
it may be their criminality rather than their absence that has implications for
his sonÕs delinquency. Indeed, Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) suggest
specifically that delinquency could influence family structure.14
Manski et al. (1992) investigate a very similar issue in their study of the
impact of family structure on a childÕs receipt of a high school diploma or
GED certificate by age 20. They consider various reasons why family structure
and childrenÕs outcomes could be jointly determined. For example, the abuse
of drugs or alcohol could make divorce more likely and also make effective
parenting less likely. In that case, unobserved variables could jointly influence
family structure and high school education, leading to a positive correlation
between the residuals of a family determination equation and those of a high
school graduation equation.
The empirical results contained in their paper are striking. They focus
extensively on the problem of endogeneity but still conclude that Òthe
13 The Inverse Mills ratio is derived in Greene (1997), chap. 20.
14 After reviewing the literature on criminal behavior and family structure, these authors
write: Òthis [evidence] does not mean that problem children will always wreck marriages...but
we do mean that the child can be as much the cause as the consequence of family patterns,
including broken homes and even abusive onesÓ (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985, p. 253).221 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY
exogeneity assumption is not far off the markÓ (p. 35).15 Of course our measure
of childrenÕs outcomes, delinquency, is different from theirs, which is high
school graduation. Possibly, there are unobserved variables that jointly
influence delinquency and family structure, notwithstanding the finding of
Manski et al. (1992) that they can be ignored in the case of education and
family structure. The approach taken here is different from theirs: we first
estimate a self-selection equation for staying in the parental household.
However, when we estimate delinquency equations separately for ÒstayersÓ
and ÒmoversÓ, as well as for both groups together, we use family structure
variables obtained from reduced form equations to account for the prospect
of endogeneity. In the reduced-form equations, two instrumental variables
are used: average family income and whether the father was alive or dead in
1979. As expected, both factors have a major impact on whether a father was
present when his son was fourteen.
VI. Do Fathers Make a Difference?
To investigate this question, we specify two ÒdelinquencyÓ equations, one
for youths living in the parental household and another for those living
separately. As described above, delinquency is indicated when a young man
is charged with a crime between ages 14 and 22. In this analysis, we condense
the thirty categories for family structure into two dummy variables regarding
a fatherÕs presence: (1) whether the father was present at age fourteen, and
(2) whether any man was present in the home at the same age. The excluded
15 To reach their result, those authors first assume exogeneity and estimate a probit equation
for obtaining a high school education using a dummy variable for family structure. Then
they estimate a trivariate model for comparison, and find the error from the family structure
equation is not correlated with residuals from either of two high school graduation equations,
each conditional on the family structure variable. The coefficient for the family structure
variable is no different than in the simple probit equation, significant in both approaches,
but with a smaller t-statistic in the trivariate model.222 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
category includes cases where another man was present, such as a stepfather,
motherÕs boyfriend, or male relative.
In addition to family structure, we included variables indicating the youthÕs
ethnicity, his age, and his cognitive ability. We had intended to include family
income as an additional explanatory variable, and indeed this variable is a
highly significant predictor of delinquency in the entire sample: ÒmoversÓ as
well as ÒstayersÓ. However, as noted above, average family income is sharply
different between these two groups, so that this variable is thereby largely an
indicator of moving or staying. Interestingly, it is not a significant explanatory
variable within either group.
The first set of equations in Table 3 deals with young men who remain in
a parental household, while the second set concerns those who no longer live
with either parent. The final equation is estimated for the entire sample:
ÒstayersÓ and ÒmoversÓ alike.16 We interpret these values as reflecting the
probabilities of being charged with a crime between ages fourteen and twenty-
two.
As can be seen, the explanatory variables are generally statistically
significant. In particular, we observe that older youths have an increased chance
of being charged with a crime. More important, we find that the ÒNo man
presentÓ variable also has a negative coefficient: slightly smaller for ÒstayersÓ
and slightly larger for ÒmoversÓ than the ÒFather presentÓ variable. Apparently,
a boy is more likely to be charged with a crime if there is another man present
in the house as compared with no man present,17 although of course the fatherÕs
presence has a salutary effect. In the entire sample, the coefficient for ÒNo
man presentÓ is also somewhat lower, although that result might reflect the
larger number of ÒstayersÓ than ÒmoversÓ in the combined sample.
16 The number of observations in this equation is larger than the combined total in the
previous two equations:  reflecting the observations lost due to missing data in estimating
the mover-stayer decision.
17 This finding conflicts with the copying or imitation hypothesis suggested earlier.223 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY




Intercept 1.46 0.55 6.75** 6.39* 1.36
(1.38) (0.48) (2.44) (1.96) (1.52)
Age --- 0.065* --- 0.014 0.062**
(2.06) (0.21) (6.23)
Father presenta -2.74* -2.80** -8.01** -8.00** -3.59**
(2.28) (2.33) (2.52) (2.52) (3.64)
No man presenta -2.25* -2.34* -8.65** -8.64** -3.29**
(1.65) (1.71) (2.39) (2.39) (2.94)
Hispanic -0.13 -0.17* -0.05 -0.06 -0.13*
(1.62) (1.96) (0.25) (0.28) (1.90)
Black -0.42** -0.45** -0.39* -0.40* -0.43**
(4.97) (5.23) (2.01) (2.02) (6.39)
A.F.Q. Test -0.004** -0.004** -0.005 -0.005 -0.004**
(2.41) (2.44) (1.32) (1.33) (3.01)
Inverse ratio -0.881** -0.077 -0.013 -0.114 ---
(4.74) (0.18) (0.04) (0.16)
No. of obs. 3,046 3,046 670 670 4,676
Log likelihood -1,245 -1,243 -305 -305 -2,072
Notes:  t  values in parentheses. **Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level.
a Fitted values.
VII. Ethnicity
A striking feature of the equations presented in Table 3 is the negative
coefficients of both the Hispanic and Black ethnicity variables. In the latter
case, the coefficients are always significantly negative; while in the former224 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
case, the coefficients are effectively zero for movers and of questionable
significance for stayers. These results follow from the characteristics of the
underlying data, which we noted earlier. To explore this matter further, we
distinguish observations for Blacks and Non-Blacks, and then re-estimate the
self-selection and delinquency equations. Our purpose is to determine the
impact of ethnicity on the estimated coefficients so we test below whether the
corresponding coefficients are the same for Blacks and Non-Blacks.18
For the decision to live separately or not, there are some significant
differences between Blacks and others. The regional variable for the South
had significantly different coefficients, as did age and the intercept. We used
the re-estimated self-selection equation to calculate a new Inverse MillÕs Ratio
for inclusion in the re-estimated delinquency equations, which are reported
in TableÊ4.
The results for delinquency are striking. There are no significant differences
between Blacks and Non-Blacks for any of the variables affecting the
probability of being charged with a crime. Only the intercepts differ by
ethnicity. We did not include age, because as noted earlier, this variable is
highly correlated with the Inverse MillÕs Ratio which is significant. In the
delinquency equations, the family structure variables are significant for both
stayers and movers. The presence of a father reduces delinquency; and ethnicity
has not significantly affected the estimated coefficients.
As acknowledged in our earlier discussion of this data set, there may be
selection bias in regard to the delinquency rates reported for minority
ethnicities. Despite that fact, the estimated effects of the primary explanatory
variables do not differ substantially between Blacks and Non-Blacks. The
impact of these factors is apparently not influenced by whatever selection
bias exists. The earlier findings are thereby supported regardless of the impact
of ethnicity.
18 Restrictions on the coefficients are tested for significance using a Wald test. After as
many restrictions are imposed as possible, the probit equation is re-estimated with the
variables appropriate to the restrictions.  A log-likelihood ratio test is then used to confirm
the constrained estimation. For a discussion of these tests, see Greene (1997), p.Ê161.225 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY
Table 4. Probit Estimates for Determinants of Delinquency: Ethnicity
Differences
Stayers Movers
Unconstr. Constrained Unconstr. Constrained
Black 2.20 1.53 11.49 3.33*
(0.64) (1.52) (1.50) (1.75)
Non-Black 1.65 1.90* 4.26* 3.60*
(1.19) (1.90) (1.74) (1.92)
Father present (F.P.): Blacka -3.91 --- -14.87 ---
(0.95) (1.60)
F.P.: Non-Blacka -2.94* --- -5.26* ---
(1.90) (1.89)
F.P.: Entire samplea --- -3.20** --- -4.59*
(2.81) (2.13)
No man present (N.M.P.): Blacka -3.57 --- -14.24 ---
(0.88) (1.60)
N.M.P.: Non-Blacka -2.52 --- -5.67* ---
(1.33) (1.77)
N.M.P.: Entire samplea --- -2.85* --- -4.77*
(2.22) (2.00)
A.F.Q. Test: Black -0.01 --- 0.01 ---
(1.06) (1.35)
A.F.Q. Test: Non-Black -0.003* --- -0.004 ---
(1.94) (1.45)
A.F.Q. Test: Entire sample --- -0.003* --- -0.003
(2.32) (1.41)
Inverse ratio (I.R.): Black -0.50 --- -0.20 ---
(1.28) (1.14)
I.R.: Non-Black -0.68** --- -0.12 ---
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VIII. Do Mothers Make A Difference?
We also estimate probit equations for our measure of delinquency, where
family structure is now represented by the presence or absence of the boyÕs
mother. The results are reported in Table 5. Before reviewing these results,
recall that there is far less variability here than with the presence or absence
of the boyÕs father; and that for all ethnic groups, over 90 percent of the boys
in the sample lived with their mothers at age fourteen. In these equations,
moreover, the motherÕs presence is measured again by its fitted value from a
first-stage equation where average family income and her life or death are the
instruments employed.
As can be seen, these empirical results contrast sharply with those reported
in Table 3, that deal with a fatherÕs presence. The first observed difference
between these results and those reported before is that family income is now
a significant factor affecting delinquency for youths who have left the parental
household even if not for those remaining. For the first category of young
men, income is apparently a more important factor than is a motherÕs presence
at age fourteen, although the reverse seems to be the case for a fatherÕs
presence. In contrast, for youths who continue to live with one or both parents,
Table 4. (Continued) Probit Estimates for Determinants of Delinquency:
Ethnicity Differences
Stayers Movers
Unconstr. Constrained Unconstr. Constrained
I.R.: Entire sample --- -0.66** --- -0.17
(4.46) (1.72)
No. of  observations 3,294 3,294 1,331 1,331
Log likelihood -1,373 -1,374 -669 -671
Notes:  t  values in parentheses. **Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5. Probit Estimates for Determinants of Delinquency: Role of
Mothers
Stayers Movers
Intercept -0.864 0.321 -1.613 -1.128*
(1.22) (0.62) (-0.91) (2.04)
Age 0.062* --- 0.017 ---
(2.00) (0.24)
Family income -0.00001** --- -0.00001* ---
(3.19) (2.21)
Mother Presenta -0.880 -1.270* 1.256 1.097
(1.47) (2.24) (2.32) (2.09)
Hispanic -0.129 -0.064 -0.288 -0.262
(1.58) (0.81) (1.59) (1.48)
Black -0.344** -0.281** -0.452** -0.454**
(4.56) (3.85) (2.58) (2.62)
A.F.Q. Test -0.005** -0.006** -0.012** -0.013**
(4.38) (5.28) (5.72) (6.03)
Inverse ratio -0.223 -0.916** 0.231 0.040
(0.52) (5.02) (0.33) (0.12)
No. of obs. 3,097 3,097 683 683
Log likelihood -1,268 -1,275 -309 -311
Notes:  t  values in parentheses. **Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level.
a Fitted values.
the opposite conclusion appears warranted. For those young men, a motherÕs
presence at age fourteen has a significant depressing effect on delinquency
rates.
The most striking feature of these findings is the major difference indicated
for a motherÕs presence as between ÒmoversÓ and ÒstayersÓ. For the former228 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
group, the estimated coefficients are both positive. There is thus no indication
here that a motherÕs presence at age fourteen had a salutary impact. On the
other hand, for youths remaining in a parental household, the ÒstayersÓ, a
motherÕs presence does have a significant effect. These findings suggest that
the self-selection decision is directly related to a motherÕs influence, while
interestingly, there was no such difference for a fatherÕs influence. As noted
above, his salutary role applies to both sets of youths.
IX. Conclusions
These empirical results are striking. Overall, the most critical factor
affecting the prospect that a male youth will encounter the criminal justice
system is the presence of his father in the home.19 All other factors, including
family income, are much less important.
There are significant policy implications that follow from these results.
Most discussions of teenage violence look first at family income. An example
is the Progressive Policy Institute report on ÒPutting Children FirstÓ (Kamarck
and Galston, 1990). Its primary proposals deal with tax credits and exemptions
for children, and for collecting greater child support payments from absent
fathers. Whatever the usefulness of these proposals to achieve other objectives,
our findings suggest that they will have little effect on teenage delinquency.
Both measures tacitly accept the fatherÕs absence from the home and seek to
ameliorate its consequences by increasing the income available to mother
and child. However, as reported above, we do not find income to be a
significant factor, once the distinction between ÒmoversÓ and ÒstayersÓ is
accounted for. The empirical results reported above suggest that policy
measures directed at income replacement will not succeed.
Furthermore, efforts to find ÒreplacementÓ fathers for teenage boys may
be equally unsuccessful. While we have no results on the impact of male role
19 These results, emphasizing the importance of fatherlessness, are confirmed in a recent
paper by Harper and McLanahan (1998). In their analysis, the dependent variable is the
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models outside the home, we note that replacement men within the home
offer little improvement in rates of teenage delinquency, and appear even to
make matters worse. Recall our finding that a mother alone with a youth is a
more salutary factor than the mother together with another man who is not
the boyÕs father. While there may be examples where replacement fathers
have desirable effects, we cannot anticipate that policy actions taken in this
area will generally have a desired effect.
Fathers play a critical role in the rearing of boys and young men, which is
complementary to that of their mother. As one psychologist concludes,
Òrejecting a son turns out to be the most demoralizing thing a father can do to
his sonÓ (Heath, 1991, p. 282). While this rejection can surely take place
within the home as outside, these findings suggest that rejection is more
common, or has a larger impact, when the father is absent from the home.
Policy measures should be directed first at increasing the prospect that boys
will grow up in homes which include their fathers as well as their mothers.
One approach would be to change divorce laws such that they treat divorce
petitions between parents differently than those between couples without
children. Where children are involved, divorces should be more difficult to
obtain. In making this recommendation, we do not mean to imply that a youthÕs
outcome is always improved by an intact family. There may well be cases
where family pathology has reached such levels that outcomes would be
improved with separation. However, the results presented here indicate that
father-presence is much preferred in merely average-quality households.
To be sure, any change in this direction will have little impact on the large
and growing proportion of births that occur outside of marriage. In the past,
these births were limited by an overwhelming social disapproval, which
unfortunately has dissipated in recent years. How to replace that disapproval
with something else such that boys grow up in the same households as their
fathers is a difficult task for which we have no suggestions. Still, it is an effort
that deserves societyÕs attention.
BeckerÕs (1981) model of altruistic behavior within the family has
important implications for public policy. It concludes that both parent and230 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
child benefit from altruistic actions taken by the parent on behalf of the child.
The goal of public policy should be to promote and encourage this conduct,
which can be done best by finding ways to support close and continued contact
between fathers and sons.
References
Antecol, H., Bedard, K., and E. Holland (2001), ÒDoes Single Parenthood
Increase the Probability of Teenage Promiscuity, Drug Use, and Crime?
Evidence from Divorce Law Changes,Ó mimeo.
Becker, G.S. (1977), ÒReply to Hirshleifer and Tullock,Ó Journal of Economic
Literature 15: 506-507.
Becker, G.S. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press.
Becker, G.S., Landes, E.M. and R.T. Michael (1972), ÒAn Economic Analysis
of Marital Instability,Ó Journal of Political Economy 85: 1141-1187.
Bergstrom, T.C. (1989), ÒA Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem and Other
Household Mysteries,Ó Journal of Political Economy 97: 1138-1159.
Bergstrom, T.C. (1996), ÒEconomics in a Family Way,Ó Journal of Economic
Literature 34: 1903-1934.
Blau, D.M. (1999), ÒThe Effect of Income on Child Development,Ó Review
of Economics and Statistics 71: 261-276.
Bonczar, T.P. and A.J. Beck (1997), ÒLifetime Likelihood of Going to State
or Federal Prison,Ó Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, U.S.
Department of Justice, March.
Card, D.E. (1985), Earnings, Schooling, and Ability Revisited, Princeton
University, Industrial Relations Section.
Case, A., Lin, I. and S. McLanahan (1999), ÒHousehold Resource Allocation
in Stepfamilies: Darwin Reflects on the Plight of Cinderella,Ó American
Economic Review 89: 234-238.
Clutton-Brock, T.H. (1991), The Evolution of Parental Care, Princeton
University Press.
Daly, M. and M.I. Wilson (1989), Homicide, New York: Aldine.231 THE IMPACT OF INCOME AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON DELINQUENCY
Greene, W.H. (1997), Econometric Analysis, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall.
Harper, C. and S. McLanahan (1998), ÒFather Absence and Youth
Incarceration,Ó unpublished paper.
Heath, D.H. (1991), Fulfilling Lives, Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Hechinger, F.M. (1994), ÒSaving Youth from Violence,Ó Carnegie Quarterly
39: 1-15.
Herrnstein, R.J. and C. Murray (1994), The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class
Structure in American Life, New York: The Free Press.
Kamarck, E.C. and W.A. Galston (1990), Putting Children First: A Progressive
Family Policy for the 1990s, Progressive Policy Institute.
Levitt, S.D. (1998), ÒJuvenile Crime and Punishment,Ó Journal of Political
Economy 106: 1136-1185.
Manski, C.F., Sandefur, G.D., McLanahan, S. and D. Powers (1992),
ÒAlternate Estimates of the Effect of Family Structure during Adolescence
on High School Graduation,Ó Journal of the American Statistical
Association 87: 25-37.
Oettinger, G.S. (1999), ÒThe Effects of Sex Education on Teen Sexual Activity
and Teen Pregnancy,Ó Journal of Political Economy 107: 606-644.
Painter, G. and D.I. Levine (no date), ÒDaddies, Devotion and Dollars: How
Do They Matter for Youth?Ó
Phillips, L., Votey, Jr., H.L., and D. Maxwell (1972), ÒCrime, Youth and the
Labor Market,Ó Journal of Political Economy 80: 491-504.
Phillips, L. and H.L. Votey, Jr. (1987), ÒRational Choice Models of Crimes
by Youth,Ó The Review of Black Political Economy 16: 129-187.
Seltzer, J.A. (1991), ÒRelationships between Fathers and Children Who Live
Apart,Ó Journal of Marriage and the Family 53: 79-101.
Thornberry, T. et al. (2000), ÒTeenage Fatherhood and Delinquent Behavior,Ó
Juvenile Justice Bulletin, January.
Trivers, R. (1985), Social Evolution, Menlo Park: Cummings.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-514,
ÒMarital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1988Ó and earlier reports.232 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Weiss, Y. and R.J. Willis (1985), ÒChildren as Collective Goods and Divorce
Settlements,Ó Journal of Labor Economics 3: 268-292.
Wilson, J.Q. (1993), The Moral Sense, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Wilson, J.Q. and R. Herrnstein (1985), Crime and Human Nature, New York:
Simon and Schuster.